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Abstract − One must provide information about the 
conditions under which [the measurement outcome] would 
change or be different. It follows that the generalizations 
that figure in explanations [of measurement outcomes] must 
be change-relating. . . . Both explainers [e.g., person pa-
rameters and item parameters] and what is explained [meas-
urement outcomes] must be capable of change, and such 
changes must be connected in the right way [1]. Rasch’s 
unidimensional models for measurement tell us how to 
connect object measures, instrument calibrations, and meas-
urement outcomes. Substantive theory tells us what inter-
ventions or changes to the instrument must offset a change 
to the measure for an object of measurement to hold the 
measurement outcome constant. Integrating a Rasch model 
with a substantive theory dictates the form and substance of 
permissible conjoint interventions. Rasch analysis absent 
construct theory and an associated specification equation is a 
black box in which understanding may be more illusory than 
not. The mere availability of numbers to analyze and statis-
tics to report is often accepted as methodologically satisfac-
tory in the social sciences, but falls far short of what is 
needed for a science. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The vast majority of psychometric thought over 
the last century has had as its focus the item. Shortly 
after Spearman’s (1904) original conception of reli-
ability as whole instrument replication proved to be 
difficult when there existed little understanding of 
what psychological instruments actually measured. 
The lack of substantive theory made it difficult indeed 
to “clone” an instrument – to make a genetic copy. In 
the absence of a substantive theory the instrument 
maker does not know what features of test items are 
essential to copy and what features are incidental and 
cosmetic [2]. So, faced with the need to demonstrate 
the reliability of psychological instruments but lacking 
a substantive construct theory that would support 
instrument cloning early psychometrics took a fateful 
step inward. Spearman (1910) proposed estimating 
reliability as the correlation between sum scores on 
odd and even items of a single instrument. Thus was 
the instrument lost as a focus of psychometric study 
and the part score and inevitably the item became 
ascendant. The spawn of this inward misstep is liter-
ally thousands of instruments with non–exchangeable 
metrics populating a landscape devoid of unifying 
psychological theory. And, this is so because…”The 
route from theory or law to measurement can almost 
never be traveled backwards” [3]. 
 There are two quotes that when taken at ex-
treme face value open up a new paradigm for meas-
urement in the social sciences: 
It should be possible to omit several test questions 
at different levels of the scale without affecting the 
individuals [readers] score [measure][4]. 
… a comparison between two individuals [readers] 
should be independent of which stimuli [test ques-
tions] within the class considered were instrumental 
for comparison; and it should also be independent of 
which other individuals were also compared, on the 
same or some other occasion [5]. 
 Both Thurstone and Rasch envisioned a meas-
urement framework in which individual readers could 
be compared independent of which particular reading 
items were instrumental for the comparison. Taken to 
the extreme we can imagine a group of readers being 
invariantly ordered along a scale when there is not a 
single item in common. No two readers are exposed to 
the same item. This would presumably reflect the limit 
of “omitting” items and making comparisons “inde-
pendent of the items” used to make the comparison.  
Compare a fully crossed data collection design in 
which each item is administered to every reader with a 
design in which items are nested in persons, i.e. items 
are unique to each person. Although easily conceived 
it is immediately clear that there is no data analysis 
method that can extract invariant reader comparisons 
from the second design type data. But is this not ex-
actly the kind of data that is routinely generated say 
when parents report their child’s weight on a doctor’s 
office form? No two children (except for siblings) 
share the same bathroom scale nor potentially even the 
same underlying technology and yet we can consis-
tently and invariantly order all children in terms of 
weight? What is different is that the same construct 
theory for weight has been engineered into each and 
every bathroom scale even though the specific mecha-
nism (digitally recorded pressure vs. spring driven 
analog recording) may vary. In addition, the meas-
urement unit (pounds or kilograms) has been consis-
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tently maintained from bathroom scale to bathroom 
scale. So, it is substantive theory and engineering 
specifications not data that is used to render compara-
ble measurements from these disparate bathroom 
scales. We argue that this illustrates the dominant 
distinguishing feature between physical science and 
social science measurement. Social science measure-
ment does not, as a rule, make use of substantive the-
ory in the ways that the physical sciences do.   
 Validity theory and practice suffers from an 
egalitarian malaise, all correlations are considered part 
of the fabric of meaning and like so many threads each 
is treated equally. Because we live in a correlated 
world, correlations of 0.00 are rare, non-zero correla-
tions abound and it is an easy task to collect a few 
statistically significant correlates between scores pro-
duced by virtually any human science instrument and 
other meaningful phenomena. All that is needed to 
complete our validity tale is a story about why so 
many phenomena are correlated with the instrument 
we are making. And so it goes hundreds and thou-
sands of times per decade, dozens of new instruments 
are islands unto themselves accompanied by dozens of 
hints of connectivity whispered to us through dozens 
of middling correlations. This is the legacy of the 
nomological network [6]. May it rest in peace! 
 Validity, for us, is a simple straightforward 
concept with a narrow focus. It answers the question 
“What causes the variation detected by the instru-
ment?” The instrument (a reading test) by design 
comes in contact with an object of measurement (a 
reader) and what is recorded is a measurement out-
come (count correct).  That count is then converted 
into a linear quantity (a reading ability). Why did we 
observe that particular count correct? What caused a 
count correct of 25/40 rather than 20/40 or 30/40? The 
answer (always provisional) takes the form of a speci-
fication equation [7] with variables that when experi-
mentally manipulated produce the changes in item 
behavior (empirical item difficulties) predicted by the 
theory. In this view validity is not about correlations 
or about graphical depictions of empirical item order-
ings called Wright maps [8]. It is about what is caus-
ing what? Is the construct well enough understood that 
its causal action can be specified? Clearly our expecta-
tion is unambiguous. There exist features of the stim-
uli (test or survey items) that if manipulated will cause 
changes in what the instrument records (what we ob-
serve). These features of the stimuli interact with the 
examinee and the instrument records the interaction 
(correct answer, strong agreement, tastes good etc.). 
The window onto the interaction between examinee 
and instrument is fogged up. We can’t observe di-
rectly what goes on in the mind of the examinee but 
we can dissect and otherwise manipulate the item 
stimuli, or measurement mechanism, and observe 
changes in recorded behavior of the examinee [9]. 
Some of the changes we make to the items will matter 
(radicals) to examinees and others will not (inciden-
tals). Sorting out radicals (causes) from incidentals is 
the hard work of establishing the validity of an in-
strument [2]. The specification equation is an instan-
tiation of these causes (at best) or their proxies (at a 
minimum).  
 Typical applications of Rasch models to human 
science data are thin on substantive theory. Rarely is 
there an a priori specification of the item calibrations 
(i.e constrained models). Instead the analyst estimates 
both person parameters and item parameters from the 
same data set. For Kuhn this practice is at odds with 
the function of measurement in the “hard” sciences in 
that almost never will substantive theory be revealed 
from measurement [3]. Rather “the scientist often 
seems rather to be struggling with facts [e.g. raw 
scores], trying to force them to conformity with a 
theory he does not doubt” [3]. Here Kuhn is talking 
about substantive theory not axioms. The scientist 
imagines a world and formalizes these imaginings as a 
theory and then makes measurements and checks for 
congruence between what is observed and what theory 
predicted: “Quantitative facts cease to seem simply the 
‘given’. They must be fought for and with, and in this 
fight the theory with which they are to be compared 
proves the most potent weapon”. It’s not just that 
unconstrained models are less potent; they fail to con-
form to the way science is practiced and most trou-
bling they are least revealing of anomalies [10].  
Andrich [10] makes the case that Rasch models are 
powerful tools precisely because they are prescriptive 
not descriptive and when model prescriptions meet 
data, anomalies arise [10]. Rasch models invert the 
traditional statistical data-model relationship. Rasch 
models state a set of requirements that data must meet 
if those data are to be useful in making measurements. 
These model requirements are independent of the data. 
It does not matter if the data are bar presses, counts 
correct on a reading test, or wine taste preferences, if 
these data are to be useful in making measures of rat 
perseverance, reading ability, or vintage quality all 
three sets of data must conform to the same invariance 
requirements. When data sets fail to meet the invari-
ance requirements we do not respond by, say, relaxing 
the invariance requirements through addition of an 
item specific discrimination parameter to improve fit; 
rather, we examine the observation model and imagine 
changes to that model that would bring the data into 
conformity with the Rasch model requirements.  
A causal Rasch model (item calibrations come 
from theory not the data) is doubly prescriptive [9]. 
First, it is prescriptive regarding the data structures 
that must be present: 
“The comparison between two stimuli [text pas-
sages] should be independent of which particular 
individuals [readers] were instrumental for the com-
parison; and it should also be independent of which 
other stimuli within the considered class [prose] were 
or might also have been compared. Symmetrically, a 
comparison between two individuals [readers] should 
be independent of which particular stimuli within the 
class considered [prose] were instrumental for [text 
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passage] comparison; and it should also be independ-
ent of which other individuals were also compared, on 
the same or on some other occasion” [5]. 
Second, Causal Rasch Models (CRM) [22-23] pre-
scribe that item calibrations take the values imposed 
by the substantive theory. Thus, the data, to be useful 
in making measures, must conform to both Rasch 
model invariance requirements and substantive theory 
invariance requirements as represented in the theoreti-
cal item calibrations. When data meet both sets of 
requirements then those data are useful not just for 
making measures of some construct but are useful  for 
making measures of that precise construct specified by 
the equation that produced the theoretical item calibra-
tions. We note again that these dual invariance re-
quirements come into stark relief in the extreme case 
of no connectivity across stimuli or examinees. How, 
for example, are two readers to be measured on the 
same scale if they share no common text passages or 
items? If you read a Harry Potter novel and answer 
questions and I read a Lord of the Rings novel and 
answer questions, how is it possible that from these 
disparate experiences an invariant comparison of our 
reading abilities is realizable? How is it possible that 
you can be found to read 250L better than I and, fur-
thermore, that you had 95% comprehension and I had 
75% comprehension of our respective books. Given 
that seemingly nothing is in common between the two 
experiences it seems that invariant comparisons are 
impossible, but, recall our bathroom scale example, 
different instruments qua experiences underlie every 
child’s parent reported weight. Why are we so quick 
to accept that you weigh 50lbs less than I do and yet 
find claims about our relative reading abilities (based 
on measurements from two different books) inexpli-
cable. The answer lies in well developed construct 
theory, instrument engineering and metrological con-
ventions. 
Clearly, each of us has had ample confirmation 
that the construct WEIGHT denominated in pounds 
and kilograms can be well measured by any carefully 
calibrated bathroom scale. Experience with diverse 
bathroom scales has convinced us that within a pound 
or two of error these instruments will produce not just 
invariant relative differences between two persons (as 
described in the Rasch quotes) but the more stringent 
expectation of invariant absolute magnitudes for each 
individual independent of instrument. Over centuries, 
instrument engineering has steadily improved to the 
point that for most purposes “uncertainty of measure-
ment” usually reported as the standard deviation of a 
distribution of imagined or actual replications taken 
on a single person can be effectively ignored for most 
bathroom scale applications. Finally, by convention 
(i.e. the written or unwritten practice of a community) 
in the U.S. we denominate weight in pounds and 
ounces. The use of pounds and ounces is arbitrary as 
is evident from the fact that most of the world has 
gone metric, but what is decisive is that a unit is 
agreed to by the community and is slavishly main-
tained through consistent implementation, instrument 
manufacture, and reporting. At present READING 
ABILITY does not enjoy a commonly adhered to 
construct definition, nor a widely promulgated set of 
instrument specifications nor a conventionally ac-
cepted unit of measurement, although, the Lexile 
Framework for Reading [11] promises to unify the 
measurement of READING in a manner precisely 
parallel to the way unification was achieved for 
LENGTH, TEMPERATURE, WEIGHT and dozens 
of other useful attributes [21].  
A causal (constrained) Rasch model [24] that fuses 
a substantive theory to a set of axioms for conjoint 
additive measurement affords a much richer context 
for the identification and interpretation of anomalies 
than does an unconstrained Rasch model. First, with 
the measurement model and the substantive theory 
fixed it is self evident that anomalies are to be under-
stood as problems with the data ideally leading to 
improved observation models that reduce unintended 
dependencies in the data. Recall that The Duke of 
Tuscany put a top on some of the early thermometers 
thus reducing the contaminating influences of baro-
metric pressure on the measurement of temperature. 
He did not propose parameterizing barometric pres-
sure so that the boiling point of water at sea level 
would match the model expectations at 3,000 feet 
above sea level. Second, with both model and con-
struct theory fixed it is obvious that our task is to 
produce measurement outcomes that fit the (aforemen-
tioned) dual invariance requirements. By analogy, not 
all fluids are ideal as thermometric fluids. Water, for 
example, is non-monotonic in its expansion with in-
creasing temperature. Mercury, in contrast, has many 
useful properties as a thermometric fluid. Does the 
discovery that not all fluids are useful thermometric 
fluids invalidate the concept of temperature? No! In 
fact, a single fluid with the necessary properties would 
suffice to validate temperature as a useful construct.  
The existence of a persistent invariant framework 
makes it possible to identify anomalous behavior 
(water’s strange behavior) and interpret it in an ex-
panded theoretical framework. Analogously, finding 
that not all reading item types conform to the dual 
invariance requirements of a Rasch model and the 
Lexile theory does not invalidate either the axioms of 
conjoint measurement theory or the Lexile reading 
theory. Rather, anomalous behaviors of various item 
types are open invitations to expand the theory to 
account for these deviations from expectation. Notice 
here the subtle shift in perspective. We do not need to 
find 1000 unicorns; one will do to establish the reality 
of the class. The finding that reader behavior as a 
single class of reading tasks can be regularized by the 
joint actions of the Lexile theory and a Rasch model is 
sufficient evidence for the reality of the reading con-
struct. 
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2. MODEL AND THEORY 
 
Equation (1) is a causal Rasch model for dichoto-
mous data, which sets a measurement outcome (raw 
score) equal to a sum of modeled probabilities 
 ܧݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀ ݎܽݓ ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ ǣ ෍ ݁ሺ௕ିௗ௜ሻͳ ൅  ݁ሺ௕ିௗ௜ሻ௜  
 
The measurement outcome is the dependent vari-
able and the measure (e.g., person parameter, b) and 
instrument (e.g., the parameters di pertaining to the 
difficulty d of item i) are independent variables. The 
measurement outcome (e.g., count correct on a read-
ing test) is observed, whereas the measure and instru-
ment parameters are not observed but can be estimated 
from the response data and substantive theory, respec-
tively. When an interpretation invoking a predictive 
mechanism is imposed on the equation, the right-side 
variables are presumed to characterize the process that 
generates the measurement outcome on the left side. 
The symbol =: was proposed by Euler circa 1734 to 
distinguish an algebraic identity from a causal identity 
(right hand side causes the left hand side). The symbol 
=: exhumed by Judea Pearl can be read as manipula-
tion of the right hand side via experimental interven-
tion will cause the prescribed change in the left hand 
side of the equation. 
A Rasch model combined with a substantive the-
ory embodied in a specification equation provides a 
more or less complete explanation of how a measure-
ment instrument works [9]. A Rasch model in the 
absence of a specified measurement mechanism is 
merely a probability model. A probability model ab-
sent a theory may be useful for describing or summa-
rizing a body of data, and for predicting the left side of 
the equation from the right side, but a Rasch model in 
which instrument calibrations come from a substantive 
theory that specifies how the instrument works is a 
causal model. That is, it enables prediction after inter-
vention. 
Causal models (assuming they are valid) are much 
more informative than probability models: “A joint 
distribution tells us how probable events are and how 
probabilities would change with subsequent observa-
tions, but a causal model also tells us how these prob-
abilities would change as a result of external interven-
tions. . . . Such changes cannot be deduced from a 
joint distribution, even if fully specified.” [13] 
A satisfying answer to the question of how an in-
strument works depends on understanding how to 
make changes that produce expected effects. Identi-
cally structured examples of two such narratives in-
clude (a) a thermometer designed to take human tem-
perature and (b) a reading test. 
 
2.1. The NexTemp® Thermometer 
The NexTemp® thermometer is a small plastic 
strip pocked with multiple enclosed cavities. In the 
Fahrenheit version, 45 cavities arranged in a double 
matrix serve as the functioning end of the unit. Spaced 
at 0.2°F intervals, the cavities cover a range from 
96.0°F to 104.8°F. Each cavity contains three choles-
teric liquid crystal compounds and a soluble additive. 
Together, this chemical composition provides discrete 
and repeatable change-of-state temperatures consistent 
with the device’s numeric indicators. Change of state 
is displayed optically and is easily read. 
 
2.2. The Lexile Framework for Reading® 
Text complexity is predicted from a construct 
specification equation incorporating sentence length 
and word commonality components. The squared 
correlation of observed and predicted item calibrations 
across hundreds of tests and millions of students over 
the last 15 years averages about .93. Available tech-
nology for measuring reading ability employs com-
puter-generated items built “on-the-fly" for any con-
tinuous prose text. Counts correct are converted into 
Lexile measures via a Rasch model estimation algo-
rithm employing theory-based calibrations. The Lexile 
measure of the target text and the expected spread of 
the cloze items are given by theory and associated 
equations. Differences between two readers’ measures 
can be traded off for a difference in Lexile text meas-
ures. When the item generation protocol is uniformly 
applied, the only active ingredient in the measurement 
mechanism is the choice of text complexity. 
In the temperature example, if we uniformly in-
crease or decrease the amount of soluble additive in 
each cavity, we change the correspondence table that 
links the number of cavities that turn black to degrees 
Fahrenheit. Similarly, if we increase or decrease the 
text demand (Lexile) of the passages used to build 
reading tests, we predictably alter the correspondence 
table that links count correct to Lexile reader measure. 
In the former case, a temperature theory that works in 
cooperation with a Guttman model produces tempera-
ture measures. In the latter case, a reading theory that 
works in cooperation with a Rasch model produces 
reader measures. In both cases, the measurement 
mechanism is well understood, and we exploit this 
understanding to address a vast array of counterfactu-
als [1]. If things had been different (with the instru-
ment or object of measurement), we could still answer 
the question as to what then would have happened to 
what we observe (i.e., the measurement outcome). It is 
this kind of relation that illustrates the meaning of the 
expression, “there is nothing so practical as a good 
theory” [12]. 
 
3.  DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF CAUSAL 
RASCH MODELS 
 
 Clearly the measurement model we have pro-
posed for human sciences mimics key features of 
physical science measurement theory and practice.  
Below we highlight several such features. 
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1. The model is individual centered.  The focus is 
on explaining variation within person over time. 
Much has been written about the disadvantages of 
studying between person variation with the intent to 
understand within person causal mechanisms [14, 15].  
Molenaar [16] has proven that only under severely 
restrictive conditions can such cross level inferences 
be sustained.  In general in the human sciences we 
must build and test individual centered models and not 
rely on variable or group centered models (with atten-
dant focus on between person variation) to inform our 
understanding of causal mechanisms.  Causal Rasch 
models are individually centered measurement mod-
els.  The measurement mechanism that transmits 
variation in the attribute (within person over time) to 
the measurement outcome (count correct on a reading 
test) is hypothesized to function the same way for 
every person (the second ergodicity condition of ho-
mogeneity) [16].  Note, however, that the fact that 
there are different developmental pathways that led 
you to be taller than me and me to be a better reader 
than you does not mean that the attributes of height 
and reading ability are somehow necessarily different 
attributes for both of us. 
2. In this framework the measurement mechanism 
is well specified and can be manipulated to produce 
predictable changes in measurement outcomes (e.g. 
percent correct). 
For purposes of measurement theory we don’t 
need a sophisticated philosophy of causal inference.  
For example, questions about the role of human 
agency in the intervention/manipulation based ac-
counts of causal inference are not troublesome here.  
All we mean by the claim that the right hand side of 
Equation 1 causes the left hand side is that experimen-
tal manipulation of each will have a predictable con-
sequence for the measurement outcome (expected raw 
score).  Stated more generally all we mean by x causes 
y is that an intervention on x yields a predictable 
change in y.  The specification equation used to cali-
brate instruments/items is a recipe for altering just 
those features of the instrument/items that are causally 
implicated in the measurement outcome.  We term this 
collection of causally relevant instrument features the 
“measurement mechanism”.  It is the “measurement 
mechanism” that transmits variation in the attribute 
(e.g. temperature, reading ability) to the measurement 
outcome (number of cavities that turn black or number 
of reading items answered correctly). 
Two additional applications of the specification 
equation are: (1) the maintenance of the unit of meas-
urement independent of any particular instrument or 
collection of instruments [17], and (2) bringing non-
test behaviors (reading a Harry Potter novel, 980L) 
into the measurement frame of reference. 
3. Item parameters are supplied by substantive 
theory and, thus, person parameter estimates are gen-
erated without reference to or use of any data on other 
persons or populations. 
  It is a feature of the Rasch model that differences 
between person parameters are invariant to changes in 
item parameters, and differences between item pa-
rameters are invariant to change in person parameters.  
These invariances are necessarily expressed in terms 
of differences because of the one degree of freedom 
over parameterization of the Rash model, i.e. loca-
tional indeterminacy.  There is no locational indeter-
minacy in a causal Rasch model in which item pa-
rameters have been specified by theory 
4. The quantitivity hypothesis [19] can be ex-
perimentally tested by evaluating the trade-off prop-
erty for the individual case.  A change in the person 
parameter can be off-set or traded-off for a compen-
sating change in text complexity to hold comprehen-
sion constant.  The trade-off is not just about the alge-
bra in Equation 1.  It is about the consequences of 
simultaneous intervention on the attribute (reader 
ability) and measurement mechanism (text complex-
ity).  Careful thinking about quantitivity makes the 
distinction between “an attribute” and “an attribute as 
measured.”  The attribute “hardness” as measured on 
the Mohs scale is not quantitative but as measured on 
the Vickers scale (1923) it is quantitative.  So, it is 
confusing to talk about whether an attribute, in and of 
itself, is quantitative or not.  If an attribute “as meas-
ured” is quantitative then it can always be represented 
as merely ordinal.  But the obverse is not true.  21st 
century science still uses the Mohs scratch test which 
produces more-than-less-than statements about the 
“hardness” of materials.  Pre 1923 it would have been 
inaccurate to claim that hardness “as measured” was a 
quantitative attribute because no measurement proce-
dure had yet been invented that produced meaningful 
differences (the Mohs scratch test produces meaning-
ful orders but not meaningful differences).  The idea 
of dropping, with a specified force, a small hammer 
on a material and measuring the volume of the result-
ing indentation opened the door to testing the quanti-
tivity hypothesis for the attribute “hardness”.  “Hard-
ness” as measured by the falling hammer passed the 
test for quantitivity and correspondence tables now 
exist for re expressing mere order (Mohs) as quantity 
(Vickers). 
Michel [19] states “Because measurement involves 
a commitment to the existence of  
quantitative attributes, quantification entails an 
empirical issue: is the attribute involved really quanti-
tative or not?  If it is, then quantification can sensibly 
proceed. If it is not, then attempts at quantification are 
misguided.  A science that aspires to be quantitative 
will ignore this fact at its peril.  It is pointless to invest 
energies and resources in an enterprise of quantifica-
tion if the attribute involved is not really quantitative.  
The logically prior task in this enterprise is that of 
addressing this empirical issue (p.75).” 
 As we have just seen we cannot know whether 
an attribute is quantitative independent of attempts to 
measure it.  If Vickers company had Michel’s book 
available to them in 1923 then they would have 
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looked at the ordinal data produced by the Mohs 
scratch test and concluded that the “hardness” attribute 
was not quantitative and, thus, it would have been 
“misguided” and “wasteful” to pursue his hammer 
test.  Instead Vickers and his contemporaries dared to 
imagine that “hardness” could be measured by the 
hammer test and went on to confirm that “hardness as 
measured” was quantitative. 
 Successful point predictions under intervention 
necessitate quantitative predictors and outcomes.  
Concretely, if an intervention on the measurement 
mechanism (e.g. increase the text complexity of a 
reading passage by 250L) results in an accurate pre-
diction of the measurement outcome (e.g. how many 
reading items the reader will answer correctly) and if 
this process can be successfully repeated up and down 
the scale then text complexity, reader ability and com-
prehension (success rate) are quantitative attributes of 
the text, person and reader/text encounter respectively.  
Note that, if say, text complexity was measured on an 
ordinal scale (think Mohs) then making successful 
point predictions about counts correct based on a 
reader/text difference would be impossible.  Specifi-
cally, successful prediction from differences requires 
that what is being differenced has the same meaning 
up and down the respective scales.  Differences on an 
ordinal scale are not meaningful (will lead to inconsis-
tent predictions) precisely because “one more” means 
something different depending on where you are on 
the scale. 
Note that in the Rasch model performance (count 
correct) is a function of an exponentiated difference 
between a person parameter and an instrument (item) 
parameter.  In the Lexile Framework for Reading (LF) 
Equation 1 is interpreted as : 
 
Comprehension = Reader Ability – Text Complexity 
  (success rate) 
 
 The algebra in Equation 1 dictates that a 
change in reader ability can be traded-off for an equal 
change in text complexity to hold comprehension 
constant.  However, testing the “quantitivity hypothe-
sis” requires more than the algebraic equivalence in a 
Rasch model.  What is required is an experimental 
intervention/manipulation on either reader ability or 
text complexity or a conjoint intervention on both 
simultaneously that yields a successful prediction on 
the resultant measurement outcome (count correct).  
When manipulations of the sort just described are 
introduced for individual reader/text encounters and 
model predictions are consistent with what is observed 
the quantitivity hypothesis is sustained.  We empha-
size that the above account is individual centered as 
opposed to group centered.  The LF purports to pro-
vide a causal model for what transpires when a reader 
reads a text.  Nothing in the model precludes averag-
ing over readers and texts to summarize evidence for 
the “quantitivity hypothesis” but the model can be 
tested at the individual level.  So, just as pressure and 
volume can be traded off to hold temperature constant 
or volume and density can be traded off to hold mass 
constant so can reader ability and text complexity be 
traded off to hold comprehension constant.  Following 
Michel [19] we note that a trade-off between equal 
increases (or decrements) in text complexity and 
reader ability “identifies equal ratios directly” and 
“Identifying ratios directly via trade-offs results in the 
identification of multiplicative laws between quantita-
tive attributes.  This fact connects the theory of con-
joint measurement with what Campbell called derived 
measurement” [19]. 
 Garden variety Rasch models and IRT models 
are in their application purely descriptive.  They be-
come causal and law like when manipulations of the 
putative quantitative attributes produce changes (or 
not) in the measurement outcomes that are consistent 
with model predictions.  If a fourth grade reader grows 
100L in reading ability over one year and the text 
complexity of her fifth grade science textbook also 
increases by 100L over the fourth grade  year textbook 
then the forecasted comprehension rate (whether 60%, 
70%, or 90%) that that reader will enjoy in fifth grade 
science remains unchanged.  Only if reader ability and 
text complexity are quantitative attributes will ex-
perimental findings coincide with these model predic-
tions.  We have tested several thousand students’ 
comprehension of 719 articles averaging 1150 words.  
Total reading time was 9794 hours and the total num-
ber of unique machine generated comprehension items 
was 1,349,608. The theory based expectation was 
74.53% correct and the observed 74.27% correct. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
This article has considered the distinction between 
a descriptive Rasch model and a causal Rasch model.  
We have argued for the importance of measurement 
mechanisms and specification equations.  The meas-
urement model proposed and illustrated (using Nex-
Temp thermometers and the Lexile Framework for 
Reading) mimics in several important ways physical 
science measurement theory and practice.  We plead 
guilty to “aping” the physical sciences and despite the 
protestations of Michell [19] and Markus and Boors-
boom [20] do not view as tenable any of the compet-
ing go forward strategies for the field of human sci-
ence measurement. 
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